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A REVIEW OF THE 1990s AND A LOOK AT WHAT'S
AHEAD*
Douglas B.L. Endreson**
With the end of the decade advancing, a review of the Indian law cases
decided by the Supreme Court in the 90s is timely. I begin where Reid
Chambers left off in his 1991 FBA speech entitled "Indian Law in the United
States Supreme Court - Experiences in the 1980s and Prospects for the
1990s." Chambers took as his starting point Louis Claiborne's 1980 FBA
speech, entitled "The Trend of Supreme Court Decisions in Indian Cases."
I then briefly address the question of what lies ahead. As part of this
discussion, I suggest the need for tribal advocates to consider how to enhance
the Supreme Court's confidence that decisions supporting Indian rights are
correct, not simply as a matter of precedent, but also in light of the real
changes that are occurring in Indian affairs and in tribal communities. Stated
simply, tribal advocates must show the Court that its Indian law decisions
have produced positive changes for Indian tribes, which have benefitted all
persons - Indian and non-Indian - over whom tribal authority, and thus
responsibility, extends.
I. An Overview of the Indian Cases in the Supreme Court in the 1990s, the
Number of Unanimous Decisions and Those Favorable to Indian Interests
A. In the Period from 1991 to the Present, the Supreme Court Decided
Thirteen Indian Law Cases. Of These Cases, Five Were Unanimous, and
Five Were Generally Favorable to Indians
1. This continues the downward trend that Chambers noted in 1991, in which
he reported that in the 1980s (including 1990) the Court decided forty-seven
Indian law cases, of which eight were unanimous or per curiam decisions, and
twenty of which were generally favorable to Indians. In contrast, in the 1970s
and 1960s, a majority of the decisions were favorable to Indians. As Chambers
reported, in the 1970s, thirty-five decisions were handed down, of which twelve
were unanimous or per curiam, and twenty were favorable to Indians. In the
1960s, thirteen decisions were issued, of which eight were unanimous or per
curiam, and nine were favorable to Indians.
B. The 1991 - date cases also suggest that Chambers' prediction that fewer
Indian law cases would be decided in the 1990s will prove to be correct. He
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based his prediction on the view that much of the substantive doctrine in
Indian law has been established, and that the field has become more mature
and well-settled, lessening the need for Supreme Court review of lower court
decisions.
1. The 1991- date cases show less unanimity than the cases decided in the
1960s, but more than in the cases decided in the 1970s and 1980s. This may
be attributable to the clarity developing in the field.
2. The 1991- date cases also appear to be reflective of certain foundational
doctrines of federal Indian law, namely that tribal sovereign authority is
inherent and continues unless expressly withdrawn, that the federal-tribal
relationship is based on the trust responsibility, and that the rules of
construction applicable to Indian enactments are essential to their proper
interpretation.
II. The Decisions Since 1991, and Their Significance in Light of Prior
Predictions
A. Tribal rights of self-government, tribal civil and criminal jurisdiction over
members, and the tribal immunity from state taxation. Claiborne predicted that
the Court would continue to recognize tribal rights of self-government and
tribal authority over members in civil, criminal, and civil regulatory matters,
and that the Court would reject state attempts to interfere with such authority.
In this regard, he saw the tax immunities of Indians and Indian property on-
reservation, and then-existing exemptions for trust lands outside reservation
boundaries, as secure.
Chambers reported that this trend was confirmed and continued in the
1980s. It has continued since then as well. The issues in these cases have
principally arisen from state efforts to collect taxes, rather than from an issue
of self-government, reflecting the continuing battle between tribes and states.
1. Oklahoma Tax Commission v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe of
Oklahoma, 498 U.S. 505 (1991): In a unanimous decision written by Chief
Justice Rehnquist (Justice Stevens concurring), the Court reaffirmed the
doctrine of tribal sovereign immunity, and rejected the State Tax
Commission's claim that it could, by counterclaiming in an action brought by
the Tribe for injunctive relief, sue to collect taxes on tribal cigarette sales to
non-Indians. In so holding, the Court rejected the State's argument that tribal
sovereign immunity should be limited to tribal courts and internal affairs, and
should not insulate tribal business ventures from State authority to administer
State laws. This is an important affirmance of tribal sovereign immunity. The
Court also rejected the State's attempt to distinguish trust land - on which
the cigarette sales occurred - from reservation lands. Both are Indian
country, the Court held, and tribal trust land qualifies as a reservation for
purposes of tribal immunity.
At the same time, the Court stated that, under Moe v. Salish & Kootenai




447 U.S. 134 (1980), the State has the authority to tax sales of cigarettes to
nonmembers by the Tribe. These decisions apply, the Court held, without
regard to whether the State has asserted jurisdiction under Public Law 280.
The Court also identified, in dicta, other means by which the State could seek
to collect taxes on nonmember sales.
2. County of Yakima v. Yakima Nation, 502 U.S. 251 (1992): In an opinion
written by Justice Scalia and joined by seven members of the Court, the Court
ruled that state and local governments have been authorized by the General
Allotment Act (as amended) to impose real property taxes on fee lands
alienated under the Act and owned by Indians within reservations. But the
Court also held that states cannot impose excise taxes on the sales proceeds
received by Indians who sell fee lands. Justice Blackmun, concurring in part
and dissenting in part, would have held both taxes to be barred.
Although the Court sustained the real property taxes, the majority opinion
reaffirmed the longstanding rule that states cannot tax trust lands or Indian
activities within reservations - unless Congress has clearly and specifically
authorized the tax, and the rule that ambiguous statutes should be construed
in favor of exempting Indians from state taxes. While concluding that in the
General Allotment Act (as amended) Congress clearly authorized taxation of
land alienated under the Act and owned by Indians in fee, the Court read the
statute narrowly - as limited to taxes on land itself. For this reason, it held
that taxes on the proceeds of land sold by Indians could not be taxed.
3. Oklahoma Tax Commission v. Sac and Fox Nation, 508 U.S. 114
(1993): In a unanimous decision written by Justice O'Connor, the Court
reaffirmed that tribal tax immunities extend to trust lands on the same basis
as they do to reservation lands, and that tribal members residing and earning
income on such lands are immune from state income taxation under
McClanahan v. Arizona Tax Commission, 411 U.S. 164 (1971). The Court
further held that the State's vehicle excise and registration fees were
preempted as to tribal members living on trust lands, finding that these
taxes - like those involved in Moe and Colville - were essentially personal
property taxes. As to tribal members residing off trust lands but earning
income on such lands, the Court indicated that McClanahan did not apply.
The Court noted, but did not reach the question of whether the right of self-
government could preempt the State's ability to tax income earned from work
for the Tribe by employees not residing in Indian country.
4. Oklahoma Tax Commission v. Chickasaw Nation, 515 U.S. 450 (1995):
Justice Ginsburg wrote the opinion for the Court, holding that the legal
incidence of Oklahoma's motor fuels tax is on the retailer, and that
accordingly, a tribal motor fuel retailer operating on trust lands is immune
from the tax. The Court also held that tribal members working for the Tribe
but living outside the Tribe's jurisdiction are subject to the State's income tax,
but did not decide whether the application of these taxes might be invalidated
under the self-governance test. The Court also rejected the Tribe's treaty-
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based claim that all tribal members working for the Tribe were immune from
State tax, whether or not they resided within tribal jurisdiction. Justice Breyer,
joined by Justices Stevens, O'Connor and Souter, dissented from the latter
holding.
B. Tribal and State Civil Jurisdiction Over Non-Indians. Claiborne had
predicted that this would be the major unsettled issue to be resolved in the
1980s. As Chambers reported in 1991, there was considerable law
development in this area in the 1980s, with results that were somewhat less
favorable than Claiborne's expectations, the principal difference being that the
balancing test set forth in the decisions of the 80s, such as White Mountain
Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136 (1980), did not provide a certain basis
to decide whether states can tax or regulate non-Indians engaged in
commercial or other transactions with Indians on trust land. Claiborne
doubted that Indian tribes would be permitted to tax or regulate non-Indians
on fee land. Since Chambers' report in 1991, there has been little further
development of the law in these areas, the decided cases being Bourland and
Attea. [See the decision in Strate v. A-i Contractors, 117 S.Ct. 1404 (1997),
concerning tribal court jurisdiction over a case involving only non-Indians
arising from an auto accident on a federally granted right of way which the
Court, after reviewing the granting instrument, treated as non-Indian-owned
fee land.]
1. South Dakota v. Bourland, 508 U.S. 679 (1993). Justice Thomas writing
for the Court in a 7-2 decision, held that the alienation of the Tribe's lands by
the Flood Control and Cheyenne River Acts eliminated the Tribe's power to
exclude nonmembers from lands taken by these Acts and its power to exercise
regulatory jurisdiction over non-Indians on these lands. The Court also
rejected the argument that inherent sovereign authority authorized tribal
regulation, relying on Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544 (1981).
Justices Blackmun and Souter dissented, applying the test in United States
v. Dion, 476 U.S. 734 (1986), finding no abrogation of the Tribe's right to
regulate non-Indian hunting and fishing in the taken area, and concluding that
the Tribe's inherent sovereign authority was also available to ground the
existence of tribal regulatory authority.
2. Department of Taxation and Finance of New York v. Milhelm Attea &
Bros., Inc., 512 U.S. 61 (1994). Justice Stevens writing for a unanimous
Court, upheld New York's cigarette regulations, which require the
precollection of state taxes on cigarettes to be sold to non-Indians by making
the wholesaler responsible for the precollection and payment of the tax.
Notably, the Court did not seek to determine the effect of the regulations on
Indian retailers or consumers, but focused on the question of whether the
Indian Trader Statutes preempted the regulations. The Court used the
preemption test to resolve the issue, holding that the regulations were
reasonably necessary to collect lawful state taxes and did not impose




C. The Interpretation of Federal Enactments in Indian Affairs and State
Immunities. With regard to the federal role in Indian affairs, Claiborne
predicted that Congress' power in Indian affairs would not be held to be as
"plenary" as had once been believed, pointing to the Court's decision in
Delaware Tribal Business Comm. v. Weeks, 430 U.S. 73 (1977), which
rejected the view that enactments in Indian affairs are not subject to judicial
review. He also thought that the Court would look more closely at federal
legislation that was blatantly discriminatory, or that adversely affected Indian
property without a rational basis in the trust responsibility. Finally, he
predicted that the Court would be more likely to hear judicial challenges to
federal actions exercising supervisory control over Indian property or tribal
affairs. The question of state immunities was not within the scope of
Claiborne's or Chambers' analysis.
Claiborne's prediction concerning the expansion of judicial review of
federal enactments in Indian affairs is amply borne out by these cases, which
include Noatak and Seminole. In addition, the Court invalidated the tribal
escheat provisions of the amended Indian Land Consolidation Act in the
Youpee case. The other cases included in this section are difficult to
categorize, but taken together may suggest that the Court is less protective of
Indian interests than in the past. Negonsett upholds the exercise of state
criminal jurisdiction over Indian country pursuant to Congressional delegation,
suggesting that exclusive federal criminal jurisdiction over Indians in Indian
country is seen by the Court as less important now than at the time of United
States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375 (1886). Lincoln holds that IlS' termination
of the Indian Children's Program is not subject to the requirements of the
Administrative Procedures Act, distinguishing Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199
(1974). Hagen finds the Unitah Valley Reservation to have been diminished,
in contrast to the result in Solem v. Bartlett, 465 U.S. 463 (1984). However,
none of these cases shows any major shifts in doctrine, nor do they overrule
any prior decisions favorable to Indian interests.
The only other decision, Department of the Interior v. South Dakota, 117
S.Ct. 286 (1996), vacates the Eighth Circuit's decision holding that the statute
authorizing the Secretary to take lands into trust for tribes and individual
Indians is an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power. The Court set
the ruling aside and sent the case back to the Secretary to be decided in
accordance with Interior's new trust land regulations without ruling on the
merits of the case.
1. Blatchford v. Native Village of Noatak, 501 U.S. 775 (1991). This was
a 6-3 decision. Justice Scalia wrote the majority opinion; Justice Blackmun,
joined by Justices Marshall and Stevens dissented. The Court held that the
State is immune from a suit for damages brought by an Indian tribe. The
opinion holds first that sovereign immunity applies to suits brought by
sovereigns as well as those brought by individuals, and then rejects the claim
that the states consented to suits by tribes in the "plan of convention" for the
No. 2]
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United States Constitution. The latter holding emphasized that while the
states' consent to suit by sister states was mutual, tribes had not waived their
immunity in favor of the states, and thus mutuality was lacking. The Court
went on to hold that 28 U.S.C. Section 1362 does not waive state immunity,
rejecting the claim that Moe compelled a different result, dismissing the
theory that Section 1362 delegated the United States' exemption from state
immunity to the tribes, and finding that Section 1362 itself was not specific
enough to constitute a waiver.
In dissent, Justice Blackmun, would have found Section 1362 to be a valid
waiver of state immunity.
2. Negonsott v. Samuels, 507 U.S. 99 (1993). This was a unanimous
decision, written by Chief Justice Rehnquist. The question was whether 18
U.S.C. § 3243 (the Kansas Act) conferred jurisdiction on Kansas to prosecute
an Indian for a state-law offense that was chargeable under the Indian Major
Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. 1153. The Court held that the language of the statute
resolved the question, finding that it provided an unqualified grant of
jurisdiction to the State to define and enforce such criminal laws as it may
enact. The federal government, the Court stated, retained exclusive
jurisdiction to try individuals under the Indian Major Crimes Act, but this did
not effect the State's power to define and enforce its own criminal laws. The
Court also found its holding to be supported by the legislative history of the
Kansas Act, in a discussion in which Justices Thomas and Scalia did not join.
The Court also rejected the petitioner's reliance on the canons of construction,
finding the statute to be unambiguous.
3. Lincoln v. Vigil, 508 U.S. 182 (1993). Justice Souter wrote the opinion
for a unanimous Court, holding that the Indian Health Services decision to
terminate the Indian Childrens' Program was not reviewable under the
Administrative Procedures Act because it involved the allocation of funds
from a lump sum appropriation, which the Court held was a decision
committed to agency discretion by law, making APA review unavailable. The
Court rejected the assertion that the trust responsibility compelled a different
result, stating that whatever its contours, it did not limit IHS' discretion to
reorder its priorities from serving Indians in the southwest to serving all
Indians nationwide, as the Court found it had done. Finally, the Court rejected
the claim that the notice-and-comment rulemaking provisions of the APA
applied to the IHS' decision, finding that it was a "general statement of
policy" exempt from such requirements. The Court distinguished Morton v.
Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199 (1974) on the ground that it involved a challenge to a
provision in a BIA manual that restricted eligibility for Indian assistance,
which the BIA's own regulations required it to publish in the Federal Register,
and read Ruiz's discussion of the trust responsibility to be based on these
circumstances.
4. Hagen v. Utah, 510 U.S. 399 (1994). Justice O'Connor wrote the




Valley Reservation had been diminished by a 1902 Act. In so holding, the
Court rejected the Solicitor General's proffered "clear-statement rule" which
would have required both explicit language of cession or surrender of tribal
interests and an unconditional commitment from Congress to compensate the
Indians before diminishment could be found. Instead, the Court adhered to its
traditional approach of examining all circumstances surrounding the opening
of a reservation.
5. Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 116 S. Ct. 1114
(1996). The Court held that states and state officials are immune, under the
Eleventh Amendment to the Constitution, from suits brought by Indian tribes
to enforce the compact negotiation requirement of the Indian Gaming
Regulatory Act. The Court was deeply divided. Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote
the majority opinion, which was joined by Justices O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy
and Thomas. Justice Stevens filed a dissenting opinion. A separate dissenting
opinion was filed by Justice Souter, joined by Justices Ginsburg and Breyer.
Thus, the case was decided by a vote of 5 to 4.
The tribes advanced two principal arguments in support of their position
that states were subject to suit to enforce the compact negotiation provisions
of IGRA. First, the tribes argued that by IGRA Congress expressly authorized
Indian tribes to sue states and that Congress has the power under the
Constitution to do so. Second, the tribes argued that the Ex parte Young
doctrine permits tribes to bring federal suits against state officials to compel
them to comply with federal law - such as IGRA's compact negotiation
requirements.
Chief Justice Rehnquist and the other four Justices who rendered the
majority opinion in Seminole rejected both arguments. As to the tribes' first
argument, the majority agreed that in IGRA, Congress clearly intended to
subject a state to suit by a tribe to compel good faith negotiations. But the
majority concluded that Congress lacks the power, under the Constitution, to
subject states to such lawsuits. In reaching this conclusion, the majority
overruled the 1989 decision in Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1
(1989), which had upheld Congress' power to subject states to suit when
acting under the Interstate Commerce Clause. The majority recognized that
if Union Gas had remained the law, Congressional authority to subject states
to suit under the Indian Commerce Clause would also exist. But the Court
reexamined the Union Gas case, criticized its reasoning, and then overruled
it. The Court found that even though the regulation of Indian commerce is
"under the exclusive control of the Federal Government," nevertheless state
Eleventh Amendment immunity may not be abrogated by Congress, even
when acting in the realm of Indian affairs.
The majority also rejected the tribes' argument that a suit to enforce
IGRA's compact negotiation provisions could be brought against state officials
under Ex parte Young. The majority opinion held that since the language of
No. 2]
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IGRA specifically provides for detailed remedies directed against the "state,"
Ex parte Young does not provide an additional remedy.
The majority did not address the potential availability of other remedies -
such as seeking direct relief from the Secretary of Interior - for tribes which
face states which fail to negotiate in good faith.
6. Department of the Interior v. South Dakota, 117 S.Ct. 286 (1996). In
this case, more generally known as the Oacoma decision, the Court of
Appeals, for the Eighth Circuit had held the principal statute authorizing the
Secretary of Interior to take lands into trust for tribes and individual
Indians - section 5 of the Indian Reorganization Act, 25 U.S.C. § 65 - to
be an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power. The Supreme Court set
aside this ruling without addressing the merits of the case and sent the case
back to the Secretary to be decided in accordance with the new trust land
regulations issued by the Interior Department while the Oacoma case was
pending.
Justice Scalia, joined by Justices O'Connor and Thomas, dissented from the
Court's ruling. Their five page dissent criticized the Government for changing
its position during the case on the issue of whether a Secretarial decision on
a trust land petition is subject to judicial review. The dissent also contended
that the issuance of new trust land regulations by the Secretary was not a
sufficient ground for sending the case back to the Secretary - and that the
Court's action provided the Secretary with an unwarranted second opportunity
to sustain his action. In the view of the dissenting Justices, since section 5
was declared unconstitutional by the Eighth Circuit, the Supreme Court should
have agreed to hear the case on the merits. That view, however, commanded
only three votes.
7. Babbit v. Youpee, 117 S.Ct. 727 (1997). In an opinion written by Justice
Ginsburg, and joined by seven members of the Court, the tribal "escheat"
provision of the amended Indian Land Consolidation Act, which was designed
to deal with fractionated allotments, was struck down. Under this provision,
shares of 2% or less in an allotment that produce less than $100 per year
escheat to the tribe upon the allottee's death. Its purpose was to avoid
perpetuating divided heirship and to help consolidate reservation lands. But
no compensation was provided to the allottee for land that escheated to the
tribe.
In 1987, the Court held in Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704 (1987) that the
Act's original escheat provision, which, was enacted in 1983, was an
unconstitutional taking of the allottee's land without just compensation. In
1984 -- after Irving was brought, but before it was decided - Congress
amended the Act. The Court's decision in Irving did not address the escheat
provision as amended. The Court held in Babbitt v. Youpee that the
amendments were not sufficient to make the Act constitutional. Justice




The original 1983 Act provided that no fractional interest in any tract of
trust or restricted land within a tribes reservation could be transferred by will
or intestate if the share was 2% or less and the tract had not produced $100
or more during the last year. Instead, the Act provided that land escheated to
the tribe. That is the provision that the Supreme Court struck down in Irving.
The Act was amended in 1984 to change the language about the $100
ceiling to require that the land be incapable of producing $100 in any one of
the five years after the decedent's death. Furthermore, instead of a total ban
on the property passing by will or intestate, the amended Act allowed a
person to leave the share by will to anyone who already had a share in the
property, but not to anyone else. Finally, the amended Act allowed tribes to
enact their own codes, which can override the provisions of the Act, if
approved by the Secretary.
The Court in Youpee held that even with these changes, an allottee's
property is still taken from the allottee without payment of just compensation.
Although the amendment allowed the property to be left to others by will,
only a limited class of people can receive the property. The Court pointed out
that this class will usually exclude the allottee's own children. The Court also
held that the Act was not saved by the provision allowing tribes to enact their
own codes, particularly because no tribe has done so.
Il. Looking Ahead
A. As Claiborne and Chambers had predicted, the law with regard to tribal
powers of self-government over members, and Indian freedom from state
regulation and taxation on trust land, absent Congress having directed
otherwise, has remained secure. This is shown by the Court's decisions
upholding these immunities and recognizing their application to trust, as well
as reservation, lands.
The result is different with respect to the taxability of fee lands allotted
under the General Allotment Act (as amended), but the County of Yakima
decision did not upset the settled principles on which Indian tax immunities
rest - as the later decided Sac and Fox and Chickasaw Nation cases show.
The reaffirmation of tribal sovereign immunity in Potawatomi is also
important, particularly the Court's unanimous rejection of the State's attempt
to narrow the doctrine to apply only to tribal courts and internal affairs. This
area of the law appears well-settled.
B. The law on tribal jurisdiction over non-Indians is fairly well-settled,
particularly with regard to tax and regulatory jurisdiction.
1. The law is clear that tribes may tax and regulate non-Indians on trust
land. In some instances, tribal regulatory power over non-Indians on fee lands
may be held to have been divested by statute, see, e.g. Bourland, but even in
these instances the decision in Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544 (1981)
sets forth two potential sources of tribal jurisdiction, as Bourland recognizes.
This is in accord with Chambers' 1991 prediction.
No. 2]
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The existence of jurisdiction under the Montana exceptions is fact
dependent, and thus tribal success in this area will be as well. This makes the
identification of relevant interests and supporting facts, and their presentation
extraordinarily important, particularly in cases involving Montana's second
exception, under which a threatened or direct effect on political integrity,
economic security, or the health or welfare of the tribe must be shown. The
exhaustion requirement, which is generally applicable to these cases, means
that the factual record in such cases will ordinarily be developed in the tribal
court. This increases the responsibility of the tribal courts and underscores the
growing importance of the tribal court bar to the future of Indian law.
To succeed in this area, tribal advocates must present a solid factual basis
in support of the need for tribal regulation under the Montana standard. This
is obviously vitally important to success in the trial court, in which the factual
record is made. It is also essential to tribal advocates' ability to present a
compelling case for tribal regulation on appeal. In marshaling the facts in the
trial court and presenting them on appeal, tribal advocates must be aware that
when tribal regulation changes the status quo, greater pressure is necessarily
placed on the tribal position - and thus on tribal advocates - to show that
the change is necessary to protect tribal interests, and that the tribal law
enacted to meet this need fairly does so.
When appropriate, the tribe's showing under the Montana test should also
look to identify threats to tribal interests that may develop in the future if
tribal regulation is not sustained. This is an area that has been largely ignored
in litigation to date. When such a theory is advanced, it is essential that it be
supported by a factual basis that shows the threat to be real, and thus far
removed from the speculative.
It should also be noted that, as a result of the increased focus on facts in
such cases, there is a greater need for trial advocacy skills in the Indian law
bar. Related to this point, the need for expert assistance in such cases has also
grown as tribes seek to present a detailed, complete presentation of their
affected interests in such cases.
In sum, the importance of a well presented and detailed showing of the
existing or threatened impact on tribal interests is vitally important in these
cases.'
2. With regard to the preemption of state jurisdiction over non-Indians on
trust lands, the balancing test, used in Attea, is likely to remain in place,
despite the limited predictive value that its precedents provide to tribes.
The balancing test is also a fact sensitive inquiry, and thus the
identification of relevant interests and supporting facts, and their effective
1. In addition, to the extent possible, the areas of relevant inquiry should, of course, first be
identified and examined through the tribal legislative process first, as this will enable the tribal





presentation is of special importance to tribal success in these cases for the
same reasons as it is with regard to cases litigated under the Montaha test. In
these cases, the practical problems - both immediate and long term -
resulting from state jurisdiction competing with that of the tribe are vitally
important to the full development and presentation of the tribal position in
these cases. And, again, the growing importance of trial advocacy skills to
success in this area must also be recognized.
3. The decision in A-I Contractors will address tribal civil adjudicatory
jurisdiction in the context of an action brought by a non-Indian against a non-
Indian. With regard to this issue, settled law recognizes the existence of tribal,
civil adjudicatory jurisdiction over actions brought by non-Indians against
Indians that arise on trust lands, Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217 (1959), thus
narrowing the issue.
C. Claiborne's prediction concerning the Court's willingness to review
federal enactments in Indian affairs is borne out by a number of recent cases,
although the results have been mixed. Overall, it is difficult to predict the fate
of this trend, although the Court's interest in such cases suggests its
continuation.
1. Youpee, and, prior to that, Irving, continue the progression begun by
Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535 (1974), and then Weeks and United States
v. Sioux Nation of Indians, 448 U.S. 371 (1980) towards establishing the
Constitutional boundaries of federal power in Indian affairs. It is now clear
beyond question that such boundaries exist and are judicially enforceable.
Continued success in judicially defining these boundaries will depend on
effective case selection.
2. With regard to the states, their Eleventh amendment immunity from
federal statutes enacted pursuant to the Indian and Interstate Commerce
Clauses has been upheld, although the impact of Seminole is likely to be less
than was first suggested, since Ex parte Young will remain available in the
absence of specific alternative remedies provided by Congress. Thus, cases
seeking injunctive relief to enforce treaties and other federal rights of Indian
tribes will generally remain unaffected.2 Other cases concerning review of
federal enactments, such as Negonsott and Hagen, while unfavorable to
Indians, will have only a limited impact. The same is true of Lincoln.
D. Although nearly three years remain, the Court will almost certainly hear
fewer cases in the 1990s than in the two preceding decades. This confirms
2. Some further light may be shed on Exparte Young in the limited context of a tribal suit
against state officials to establish both the tribe's title to and sovereign authority over the bed and
banks of a navigable river - this issue is presented by Idaho v. Coeur D'Alene Tribe now pending
before the Supreme Court. The Ninth Circuit held that Ex parte Young was not available to
overcome the State's Eleventh Amendment immunity from a suit to quiet title to property claimed
by the State. The Ninth Circuit, however, did conclude that Ex parte Young permitted the tribe
to sue state officials for a determination of the tribe's sovereign authority over the bed and banks
of the river.
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Chambers' prediction. It is also true that developments in Indian law are
increasingly occurring in Congress. However, the result of recent proposals
in Congress has been to put tribes on the defensive, although unfavorable
enactments with regard to Indian gaming and trust lands have thus far been
held off.
1. Claiborne had remarked that the low visibility of Indian cases in the
Supreme Court had worked to the tribes' advantage. He commented that the
Court's decisions in Indian cases had not received much national press
attention, and that as a result the Court was able to consider these cases free
from the pressures of public and press attitudes. For the same reason,
Claiborne did not see a real risk of the Court's decisions being overturned by
Congress.
These conditions may no longer exist, as Seminole and recent activity in
Congress suggests, and as a result of the press focus on Indian gaming. As
a result, it is even more important for Indian tribes to get their message out
publicly. In so doing, tribes must show that the Self-Determination policy is
working, and that its benefits accrue to Indians and non-Indians alike. Equally
important is that Indian tribes show how much more remains to be done -
200 years of federal neglect must be overcome - and that the tribes
demonstrate that the Self-Determination policy and the sovereign rights of
Indian tribes are both critical components to the tribes' ability to succeed ii
these endeavors.
The importance of this effort to tribal success in litigation, though difficult
to quantify or estimate with any precision, is clear. Stated simply, for Indian
rights to continue to be advanced successfully in litigation, Indian tribes must
show that the decisions to date have produced positive results, which provide
both a reason to continue to follow established precedent, and a solid
foundation for the expectation that continued support for Indian rights will
continue to produce positive results for Indian tribes, results that benefit all
persons - Indian and non-Indian - over whom tribal authority, and thus
responsibility, extends.
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